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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES.TATE 
OF )!IGNON DENHALTER LEWIS·, Case No. 7724 
DECEASED, 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
vV e have considerable difficulty in ascertaining the 
particular provisions of our law that is relied up·on by 
the respondent as the basis of his claim that he is entitled 
to participate in the distribution of the estate of Mignon 
Lewis Deceased, even if it be assumed that he is the 
natural grandchild of Henry Charles Denhalter. 
On page 13 of respondent's brief there is cited the 
· provision of Sections 14-2-14 and 14-4-12 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943 and on page 14 of such brief is 
cited U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10. Ap.parently respondent 
claims that the intention of the Legislature is to be 
gleaned from all of such provisions. Obviously the in-
tentions of the Legislature in the enactment of U.C .. A., 
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1943, 14-4-12 and U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 could not have 
been influenced by the passage of U.C.A., 1943, 14-2-14 
because the latter act was not passed until 1911, 'vhile 
the former acts were passed many years before. A 
history of an act which is substantially the sa1ne as 
U.c·.A., 1943, 14-4-12 will be- found in the case of Chap-
man v. Handley, 7 Ut. 49 and the companion case of In re 
Estate of Thomas Cope, 7 Ut. 63, 24 Pac. 567, which 
latter case was reversed in the case of Cope v. Cope, 137 
u.s. 682. 
In the case of In re Garr's Estate, 31 Ut. 57, 86 Pac. 
757 it will be noted that Sections 10 and 2833 Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1898 are the same as U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-
12 and U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 respectively. 
Before the respondent can recover he must bring 
himself within one of the provisions of the law relating 
to the right of illegitimate children to inherit property. 
An illegitimate child cannot derive a part of such right 
from one of such provisions and the remainder from 
some other provision of our statute. 
In our original brief, we have pointed out that the 
language of our statute on bastardy is not susceptible of 
a construction that the marriage of the parents of an 
illegitimate child without more will render such child 
legitimate. We shall not repeat what is there said. 
There is however another reason which we neglected 
to discuss in our original brief why the provisions of 
our so-called bastardy law (U.C.A. 1943, 14-2-14) does 
not aid the respondent in sustaining his claim to a part 
of the estate of Mrs. Lewis. As stated in our original 
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brief, the original bastardy la'v "'a8 enacted in 1911, 
La'Y~ of Utah, 1911, Chapter G2. At the time of the 
enactn1ent of that la,v-, the father of the respondent had 
been born. Trs. 43-46. He had been adopted by the John-
stons. Tr. 61. His mother and Henry Charles Denhalter 
had been divorced. The divorce \Vas granted on July 
29, 1910. Tr. 65-67. 
l--:-tah now has and at all times involved in this pro-
ceeding has had a lavv which provides that "No part of 
these revised statutes is retroactive unless expressly 
so provided." U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-3. Such was also the 
provisions of Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, Sec. 2490. 
Independent of statute such is the law generally as is 
held by this and the courts generally. Farrel v. Pingree, 
5 Ut. 443, 16 Pac. 843; Mercur Gold Mining & Milling 
Co. v. Spry, 16 Ut. 222, 229; 52 Pac. 382. S.ee also 59 
C.J.S. 1157 et seq.; Craw fords' Statutory Construction, 
page 562, Sec. 277 et seq; Lewis' Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, Vol 2, page 1157, Sec. 641 et seq. If the 
court wishes to pursue the inquiry further, numerous 
cases will be found collected in foot notes to the text 
above mentioned. 
The authorities teach that a retroactive law is a law 
that looks backward or to things that are past. It grants 
a right where none before existed or attempts to deprive 
one of a right which formerly existed. The law making 
power is prohibited from enacting some retroactive laws 
such as ex part facto and laws impairing the obligations 
of contracts by constitutional provisions. We do not 
contend that there is any constitutional inhibition pre-
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venting the Legislature from rendering children legiti-
n1ate that were illegitimate before such law \Vas enacted, 
but we do contend that there is no language in the bas-
tardy law of 1911 or the amendments thereto which shows 
or tends to show a legislative intention to give such 
law a retroactive effect so as to confer a right of inheri-
tance upon the respondent's father or upon him. 
On pages 14 and 16 of respondent's brief, the case of 
Bohwer v. District Court of First Judicial District, 41 
Ut. 279; 125 Pac. 671 is discussed at some length and a 
substantial part thereof is quoted. As we read that case 
it ma.kes against the claim of respondent. We have dis-
cussed that case on pages 42 and 43 of our original brief 
and no useful purpose will be served by repeating what 
is there said. 
Suffice it to again note that notwithstanding the 
p-rovisions of U.C.A., 101-4-10 was at the time involved 
in the case of Bohwer v. District Court supra, a part of 
the law of this state this court expressly held that a child 
meeting the requirements of that section is not thereby 
rendered legitimate. Indeed the very language of U.C.A., 
1943, 101-4-10 refers to a child that is by such section 
made an heir of the person who acknowledges himself to 
be the father, as an illegitimate child. So also as pointed 
out in our original brief that the only right conferred up-
on an illegitimate child by that section is the right to 
inherit the estate of his parents. As the authorities 
teach, that section is one of succession, not of legitima-
tion. It is found in our law of succession. If the Legisla-
ture had intended by that section to render an illegiti-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
mate child legitilnate, it 'Yould have so provided as it did 
in Sections U.C.A., 1943 14-4-12 and 1±-2-14. 
On page 18 of respondent's brief, there is cited the 
case of Wolf v. Gull, where it is held that legitimate chil-
dren can inherit from their grandmother by right of 
representation. \Ve have no quarrel with the law there 
announced. Indeed "'"e cannot well see how the law could 
be otherwise. If a child is rendered legitimate for all 
purposes, such a status would doubtless include the 
right of inheritance the same as in the case of a legiti-
mate child. If the respondent fell within the provisions 
of either U.C.A., 1943 14-2-14 or U.C.A. 1943, 14-4-12, we 
would not be here contending that he could not partici-
pate in the estate of Mrs. Lewis if in fact he is the grand-
child of her brother. 
In both our original and in this· brief, we have 
pointed out why the respondent may not successfully 
establish a right by reason of U.C.A., 1943, 14-2-14, the 
so-called bastardy law. 
On pages 31 and 32 of our original brief, we have 
enumerated the requirements necessary to render an 
illegitimate child legitimate under the provisions of 
U.C.A., 1943, 14-4-12. We are not entirely clear whether 
the respondent claims that his father was rendered 
legitimate by having complied with that statute. On page 
27 of respondent's brief, it is said that "the language of 
14-4-12, which states that the child made legitimate by the 
father's acknowledgement is thereupon deemed for all 
purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." Neithe-r 
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merely by acknowledgement. 
If any lingering hope is entertained by respondent 
that his father was rendered legitimate by U.C.A., 1943, 
14-4-12, we direct the attention of the court to the facts 
that all of the provisions of that section must be met to 
render a child legitimate. If the court desires additional 
authorities in support of the view that the evidence does 
not bring the respondent's father within_ that provision 
of our statute, we direct the attention of the c·ourt to 
the following additional authorities: 7 C.J.S., page 948, 
Sec. 20 and 10 C.J.S. p. 55 to 59 and cases cited in foot 
notes to the text. 
On page 21 of respondent's brief there is cited the 
case of Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294; 182 Pac. 538, 540, 
and as we understand respondent's contention, the pro-
visions of the laws of Kansas cited in the opinion are so 
near like the pro~isions of our U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 that 
the construction placed by the Kansas court on its stat-
utes mentioned in that opinion should be placed upon 
our S·ection 101-4-10. 
There are a number of reasons why the decisions of 
the Courts of Kansas are not applicable to our statu-
tory law. Kansas apparently has no such provisions 
as our section 14-2-14 and 14-4-12 whereby an illegitimate 
child may become legitimate. It will be seen from the 
opinion in the Smith case that there were a number of 
other statutes in Kansas that the Court ap·parently held 
gave support to the result reached in that case. Moreover, 
in examining the Smith case and other Kansas cases from 
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that state relating to illegitin1ate children, it is enlight-
ening to read the case of Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F (2d) 464 
cited on page :2± of respondent's brief . 
. A .. reading of the case of Pfeifer v. Wright shows 
that the judges of the Federal Circuit of Appeals had a 
struggle to ascertain just 'vhat the law touching illegiti-
mate children 'Yas in the State of Kansas. All of the 
judges "~ere apparently agreed that language such as 
that contained in the Kansas law does not rendeT an 
illegitimate child legitimate at common law so as to en-
title such child to inherit from persons other than those 
specifically provided for in the law. One of the judges 
took the view that Kansas had apparently adopted the 
civil law and therefore an illegitimate child could inherit 
the same as if legitimate. 
vVhen the court reads the Pfeifer v. Wright case it 
will, we believe, find that the law there announced is in 
accord with the position of appellants, namely, that stat-
utes such as our U.C.A., 1943, 101-4-10 is a statute of 
succession and as such an illegitimate child is limited to 
inherit in the estate of his father and is wholly without 
right in the estate of collateral relatives of his father. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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